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RESUMEN: El presente europeo como historia mundial
n el artículo se analiza la sociedad europea desde una pers-
pectiva comparativa global, viéndola como parte de la historia 
mundial. Al mismo tiempo, se procura enfocar el presente como 
historia, es decir, relacionando la situación actual con el pasado 
y, sobre todo, con el futuro. Se sitúa, entonces, a Europa en la 
historia de la Modernidad y en la dinámica de los diversos sis-
temas mundiales, a saber, el ecosistema planetario, el sistema poblacional, el 
GHOSRGHU\ODLQÀXHQFLDHOVLVWHPDVRFLRHFRQyPLFR\¿QDOPHQWHHOFXOWXUDO
Los futuros que se abren ante esa Europa oscilan entre una profundización de 
su relativa decadencia en términos mundiales y la búsqueda de una Segunda 
Modernidad.
ABSTRACT
The task of analyzing European society may be approached from many 
angles. The one chosen here is a global comparative perspective, an effort to 
step outside the tempting but myopic and often misleading familiarity of insi-
de experience. Let us look at European society today as part of world history. 
What does it mean to grasp the present as history? It means to look out for how 
the current situation is related to the past, and, above all, to the future. 
We shall here try to locate Europe in the history of modernity, and, secondly, 
in the dynamics of the world systems, systems in plural, as I shall explain 
later.
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I. THE EUROPEAN ROUTE TO MODERNITY AND TO POST-
MODERNIzATION
First a brief theoretical excursion, clarifying what is here meant by 
modernity, a controversial notion given several different meanings. The most 
IUXLWIXO GH¿QLWLRQV DUH WKH OHDVW DUELWUDU\ DQG LGLRV\QFUDWLF ZKLFK XVXDOO\
implies a respect for etymological meaning and an abstention from loading 
WKHGH¿QLWLRQZLWKDSULRULVWLFFRQQRWDWLRQV0RGHUQLW\VKRXOGWKHQEHVHHQDV
a temporal orientation, only. Modernity is a culture claiming to be modern, in 
the sense of turning its back on the past –the old, the traditional, the passé–, 
and looking into the future as a reachable, novel horizon. Modern man/woman, 
society, civilization have a direction, forward. In order to keep its analytical 
edge, modernity should not be trivialized by attempts at translating it into 
concrete social forms.
0RGHUQLW\HVWDEOLVKHGLWVHOIWKURXJKVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOFRQÀLFWLQUXSWXUHV
with the past, breaking with ancient wisdom and customs. But these breaks 
took different expressions in different parts of the world, the traditional Others 
were different as well as the composition of the forces of the modern. The 
European road to modernity was unique in the sense that it was a road of 
civil war. The forces of modernity and the forces of tradition were internal to 
Europe, although colonial wars and colonial conquests crucially affected the 
intra-European struggles of the old and the new. The French Revolution, for 
instance, owed much to the weakening of the ancien régime from its series of 
world wars with Britain.
TABLE 1. 5RDGVWRWKURXJK0RGHUQLW\E\WKH/RFDWLRQ RI)RUFHVDQG&XOWXUHV)RUDQG$JDLQVW
PRO-MODERNITY
INTERNAL
EXTERNAL
35($17,02'(51,7< FORCED IMPORTED AND LEARNT
INTERNAL Europe Colonial zone Reactive modernisation
EXTERNAL New Worlds of Settlement
Note: Countries of Reactive, or externally induced, Modernisation, e.g., Japan, China, Ottoman Empire/Turkey, 
Iran, Siam/Thailand
7KHQHZIXWXUHRULHQWDWLRQRIWKHODVWFHQWXULHV¿UVWHPHUJHGLQ(XURSHQRW
DVDQDWXUDOHPDQDWLRQRI(XURSHDQFLYLOLVDWLRQEXWRXWRIFRQÀLFWV LQWHUQDO
to Europe, to North-western Europe primarily. In other words, the European 
route was one of civil war, which pitted the forces of reason, enlightenment, 
nation/people, innovation, and change against those of the eternal truths of the 
Church, of the sublime wisdom and beauty of Ancient philosophy and art, of 
the divine rights of kings, of the ancient privileges of aristocracy, and of the 
customs of fathers and grandfathers. 
In the New Worlds of European settlement, anti-modernity was, in the 
¿UVWULVHRIPRGHUQFXUUHQWVSHUFHLYHGDVPDLQO\H[WHUQDOLQWKHFRQVHUYDWLYH
metropolis, in Britain to North America, in Spain and Portugal to Latin America, 
and, increasingly, in the local Others of the settler societies, the natives, the 
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slaves, and the ex-slaves. Independence got rid of the external metropolis, but 
what to do with the local Others was to haunt the moderns of the New Worlds 
for a very long time –still does–, particularly in Latin Indo-America, where the 
natives were not wholly or virtually exterminated.
To the Colonial zone, from North-western Africa to Southeast Asia, 
modernity arrived literally out of the barrel of guns, with the colonial conquest, 
subduing the internal forces of tradition. Modernity was not carried further 
by settlers, but by new generations of natives, of “évolués” who turned what 
they had learnt from their conquerors against the latter. After Independence the 
ex-Colonial zone has carried a complex legacy of nationalism, a colonial elite 
culture –of language, habitus, and, e.g., exotic sports interests (like cricket in 
South Asia and the Anglo-Caribbean)– and colonial-turned-excolonial state-
society bifurcation.
The countries of Reactive Modernisation were challenged and threatened 
by colonial domination, and in the face of these threats a part of the internal elite 
started to import innovation from the outside, creating special combinations of 
modernism and traditional authority. Japan is the most successful and clear-cut 
example.
The European civil war between the forces of modernity and those of 
tradition was a protracted struggle over centuries, starting in science in early 
17thFHQWXU\LQFOXGLQJPDQ\GHIHDWVRIWKHPRGHUQDQGSROLWLFDOO\GH¿QLWHO\
won in Spain only in the l970s, with the end of the Franco regime. But the 
question here, this afternoon, is where is European modernity today? In order 
to at a provisional answer, we had better specify modernity into a set of “master 
narratives” or guiding lines of modernist argumentation. There are, at least, 
¿YHVXFKPDLQGLVFXUVLYHWKHPHVRIPRGHUQLW\
TABLE 2. 0DVWHU1DUUDWLYHVRI0RGHUQLW\
7+(3$67:$67+(35(6(17,6 THE FUTURE WILL BE
1. Ignorance, superstition, subservience to authority Emancipation, individual: rational, empirical
2. Oppression, exploitation Emancipation/liberation, collective: socio-political
3. Poverty, disease, stagnation Growth, progress, development
4. Conditions of no/less competition 6XUYLYDORIWKH¿WWHVWPRUHUHODWLYHSRZHU
5. Rule-bound, imitative Creative vitality
Has the very triumph of modernity made these modernist contrasts and 
futures irrelevant? That is the challenge of post-modernism. The answer, 
, WKLQNKDV WREHVSHFL¿HGDFFRUGLQJ WRQDUUDWLYHSROLWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHDQG
world region. Let us make a rapid overview of Europe in these respects.
7KH ¿UVW PRGHUQLVW DUJXPHQW RI LQGLYLGXDO HPDQFLSDWLRQ E\ WKH XVH RI
reason the senses of observation, was summed up in the Enlightenment, and in 
.DQW¶VGH¿QLWLRQRILW7KHYLFWRU\RIVFLHQFHDQGWKHVHFXODUL]DWLRQRIVRFLHW\
in the recent decades have made enlightenment a rather banal part of European 
everyday present life. Counter-assertions of divine authority have become 
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marginal, even in post-Communist Europe. So-called New Age attempts at 
UHHQFKDQWLQJWKHZRUOGDSSHDUERWKVXSHU¿FLDODQGPDUJLQDO
Collective emancipation has become focused on gender and sex, on 
the liberation of women from gender oppression and discrimination and of 
homosexuals from sexual ditto. The emancipation of the industrial working-
class has run as far as it could get, in the 970s-early l980s, and no emancipatory 
project of the post-industrial classes, employed and unemployed, has caught 
on yet. Emancipation from ethnic discrimination, an increasingly important 
theme on the European left, remains a minority striving as long as it is not 
integrated into an emancipation from the nation-state into some post-national, 
multicultural polity.
Growth and development, economic modernization in this sense, constitute 
a leitmotif of the European political, as well as economic, elites. In particular, 
this theme has become the banner of the neoliberal right, but also by a neoliberal 
FHQWUHOHIWPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWO\H[SUHVVHGE\7RQ\%ODLUDQG%ODLULVP(DVWHUQ
Europe, historically the late modern part of the continent, is engaged in a large-
scale modernist project of catching up development and growth. But, what 
about Western Europe? It seems that economic progress has little of non-elite 
appeal outside a rather small stratum of young centre-right prospective career-
climbers. Sustained growth may be needed to vouchsafe pension obligations, 
but it is no longer part of a popular vision of a new, higher standard of living. 
The political development of Europe, as “an ever closer union” among its 
peoples was always mainly an elite project –in spite of its success– and is 
currently even more so.
The fourth modernist story, of new struggles for survival, was that of Social 
Darwinism and later of Fascism. It has recently returned in the neoliberal vision 
of globalization, with its new demands of competitive effort. But globalist 
Social Darwinism is little more than a delimited managerial ideology. The 
main popular response to globalist challenges has rather been conservative, 
defending existing social rights of workers and of citizens.
Finally, the disappearance of rule-bound aesthetic academicism has left 
modernism without an aesthetic target. No wonder, then, that the modernist 
drive to constant innovation produced postmodernism in the arts and in 
DUFKLWHFWXUHDQGQRZRQGHUWKDWLQWKRVH¿HOGVWKHPRPHQWRISRVWPRGHULVP
has already become passé.
To conclude, the very success of Western European modernity has sapped 
its energy and thrust. Economically, a serene prosperity makes good sense. 
But the post-modernization of Europe is uneven not only between east and 
west. It is also upsetting European politics. Historically, the European left-right 
division was, by and large, with some exceptions, a division between leftwing 
modernism and rightwing traditionalism. What is currently happening is a 
post-modernization of the left and a modernization of the right. This creates a 
new political landscape, quite bewildering to many, particularly, but not only, 
to the historical popular electorate of the left.
One of the increasingly clear differences between Western Europe and the 
United States is that the latter spawns a much broader based rightwing politico-
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economic modernism, believing in its capacity as well as in its right to create 
a new future. In a currently hegemonic coalition, this rightwing modernism is 
politically beefed up by militants of religious fundamentalism. On the world 
arena, the post-modernization and self-doubt of the distinctive European 
political traditions, of Social Democracy, popular Christian Democracy, 
Eurocommunism, and Social Liberalism, mean a weakening of Europe in 
relation to the USA. 
Western Europe generated the pioneers of the current world epoch 
of modernity, who came to upset the balance of the whole world. Today, 
Western Europe, perhaps together with Japan, is the site of an uneven post-
modernization, which tends to contribute to a new tilt of the world, to the 
United States, at least in the short run.
But after this situating of Europe in the time of modernity, we should try to 
locate it in the spatial dynamics of world systems.
II. THE WORLD SYSTEMS AND EUROPE WITHIN THEM
What is currently referred to as “globalization” is a multidimensional 
phenomenon of world-wide interaction and interrelations. In order to get at 
WKLVPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOLW\ZHPD\GLVWLQJXLVK¿YHPDMRUSODQHWDU\V\VWHPVRI
humankind, in which Europe is located, and being challenged. Talking about 
systems in plural is meant to convey their irreducibly possible differences, 
their analytical distinguishability, but not their inter-connexions and 
interdependencies. 
The order of presentation is basically arbitrary. The one chosen here runs 
from the most natural to the most cultural without, it should be underlined, any 
SDUWLFXODUDVVXPSWLRQVRIUHODWLYHFDXVDOHI¿FDF\
2.1. With that contingent logic of presentation we should start with a few 
words about the planetary ecosystem. 
(XURSH LV OXFNLO\ ORFDWHG LQ WKLV V\VWHPZLWKVXI¿FLHQWZDWHU UHVRXUFHV
and outside or at the margin of planetary disasters, like earthquakes, tsunamis, 
and high-disease-producing climates, like the tropics. But European ecology 
is also a historical product of European social action. Europe was a historical 
pioneer of public hygiene and health. Malaria occurred in the 18th century even 
in the south of England, for instance, but was eliminated long ago. HIV-AIDS 
ZDV¿UVWPDLQO\D1RUWK$PHULFDQGLVHDVHEHIRUH LWEHFDPH$IULFDQ LQ WKH
l990s. In Europe it has been relatively marginal. 
 On the whole, its high ecological quality of life, with less natural risk, 
less pollution, less urban slumming, and less violence, has become a distinctive 
feature of early 21st century Europe. A worldwide composite environmental 
sustainability index is topped by four European countries and Canada, while 
the Ukraine and Belgium come quite low. An urban quality of life index has 8 
European cities, headed by zurich and Geneva, among the eleven on top of the 
world, whereas another ranking of healthy cities puts Canadian Calgary and 
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Ottawa, and Honolulu before most European cities, among which Helsinki, 
Oslo and Stockholm stand out.
2.2. A second world system is humanity as a population system:
Demographically, the weight of Europe is going down, from a quarter 
of world population in 1900 to an eighth in 2000, and projected to harbour 
RQO\D¿IWHHQWKLQ*HUPDQV,WDOLDQV5XVVLDQVDQGPDQ\RWKHU(DVWHUQ
Europeans have already begun dying out, with deaths exceeding births. Europe 
is also ageing, possibly having almost one third of its population 65 years 
of age or older by 2050. Ageing and probable population decline are setting 
Europe and Japan off from USA, the only rich country still reproducing itself 
naturally.
20th century experience tells us, though, that birth rates are hardly 
governed by some iron law of “demographic transition”, and may go up as 
well as down. A comparison of surveyed desires of children, on one hand, 
and actual birth rates, on the other, shows that there is currently a Western 
(XURSHDQELUWKGH¿FLWRI DERXW FKLOGSHUZRPDQ7KDW LV(XURSHDQ
women are currently bearing fewer children than they would like to –under 
ideal conditions of work, housing, and adequate partner supply–.
)RUDOPRVW¿YHFHQWXULHV(XURSHZDVDFRQWLQHQWRIRXWPLJUDWLRQH[SRUWLQJ
its adventurers, its dissidents, and its poor surplus population to other parts of 
the world. Particularly in the decades just for and after 1900, this was a very 
important, very privileged position in the population system of humankind. 
Since the l960s, Europe as whole, but actually Western Europe, has become 
a continent of immigration. For Europeans, this should be a source of pride. 
,WWHVWL¿HVWRWKHVXFFHVVRISRVWFRORQLDO(XURSHWKDWLWKDVEHFRPHDSROHRI
world attraction. The change has been dramatic, most recently in Southern 
Europe, which had the longest history of emigration, but also in other parts of 
Europe. Traditionally ethnically very homogenous Sweden, for example, has 
currently as large a proportion of its population foreign born the United States, 
RI¿FLDOO\DWOHDVW7KDWLVDERXWRQHHLJKWKRILWVSRSXODWLRQ
A major challenge to Europe is whether it will be as successful in 
incorporating the new Europeans as USA has been in its reception of new 
Americans. So far, this is hardly the case.
 7KHV\VWHPRISRZHUDQGLQÀXHQFH+HUHZHVKRXOGWDNHWKUHHNH\YD-
ULDEOHVLQWRDFFRXQWPLOLWDU\SRZHUFLYLOLDQSRZHUDQGLQÀXHQFH
The military decline of Europe was demonstrated in World War II, and 
FOHDUWRDOOE\WKHWLPHRIWKH6XH]¿DVFR(IIRUWVWRXQGRLWDUHPRVWXQOLNHO\
to succeed. Global political hegemony was lost by military defeats, wartime 
economic devastation and by the end of European colonial empires. In the 
SRVW::,,FRQ¿JXUDWLRQRI³WKH:HVW´(XURSHKDVDOZD\VEHHQWKH MXQLRU
the dispensable partner to the “indispensable nation”, as Clinton’s Secretary of 
State called the United States. European world supremacy will hardly return. 
If military power in the world will become multipolar again, the balance to the 
US superpower will come from China and India.
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Civilian power may take several forms. Economic clout and muscle is 
clearly one and important. The EU is without doubt a major economic power in 
the world, and we shall return to it below. But civilian power is also constituted 
legal authority. It is the non-military power of sovereign states and the power 
of international law.
/HWPH¿UVWVD\DIHZZRUGVDERXWWKHSRZHURIQDWLRQVWDWHVLQWKHFXUUHQW
era of globalization. What is often forgotten is that the last decades of the 
20th century saw an enormous expansion of the state. In the OECD countries 
–i.e.,Western Europe, North America, Oceania and Japan–, public expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP increased on the population-weighted average by l9 
percentage points between l960 and 2000. This growth of the state is most 
pronounced in Western Europe, where general government outlays made up 
almost half (49%) of the GDP of Euroland in 2004. The civilian power of the 
QDWLRQDO(XURSHDQZHOIDUHVWDWHVLVVXEVWDQWLDODQGPXFKELJJHUWKDQ¿IW\RU
a hundred years ago.
In a context of migration studies it should be added, that state control of 
international migration is tighter today than a century ago.
Europe is of old the world’s lawyer, the source, the pioneer and the vanguard 
of international law. The political process of European integration has above 
all else been the constitution of Europe as a normative area of transnational 
law. 
7KH &RXQFLO RI (XURSH DGRSWHG LQ O WKH ¿UVW LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDOO\
binding convention on human rights, enforced by a Commission, a Committee 
of Ministers with a majority voting system and a Court. It was concerned with 
civil and political rights only, and it took more than a decade for its supra-
nationality to be fully recognized by all member states, but it did take effect. 
In 1961 an extensive European Social Charter was adopted, formulated as 
obligations accepted by the member states, with a supra-national monitoring 
and complaint system, in the last instance issuing into recommendations of the 
Ministerial Committee with two thirds majority.
The European Court of Justice, with support from the national judiciaries 
of the EEC/EU member states, has constituted a major supra-national force 
in the construction of a new Europe. In a couple of early landmark decisions, 
in l963, l964 and in 1970, the Court established the principles of direct effect 
of Community law, and of its supremacy over national law, including, within 
its area of jurisdiction, over national constitutional law. In the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case of l970 the Court stated, that “the validity of a 
Community measure (…) cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter 
to (…) fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state...”.
It is only in Europe that a transnational legal power has been established. 
But the EU and its member states are the main force behind global initiatives 
and support of attempts at international law and normative regulation, from the 
UN Conventions to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. 
$ V\VWHP RI SRZHU DOVR LQFOXGHV PRUH GLIIXVH SURFHVVHV RI LQÀXHQFH
whether by persuasion or by inspiration. The European system of a number 
of more or less equal sovereign states gave rise to diplomacy as a profession. 
24 Göran Therborn
REVISTA ALTERNATIVAS. CUADERNOS DE TRABAJO SOCIAL, Nº 15-2007, [17-28], ISSN: 1133-0473 © UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE 
In today’s world politics, the European skills of and preference for diplomacy 
differ from the more blunt, threatening and violent policies of the United States. 
The latter not seldom see to it that European civilian diplomacy is overtaken by 
PLOLWDU\DFWLRQDVLQ%RVQLD.RVVRYRDQG,UDT(XURSHDQGLSORPDWLFLQÀXHQFH
is kept in tight reins by the Americans.
,QÀXHQFHPD\IXUWKHUWDNHWKHIRUPRILQVSLUDWLRQRISURYLGLQJPRGHOVRI
action to other actors. The union of Europe has become an important source of 
inspiration, and even a model of partial imitation, in Southeast Asia, in Latin 
America, and most recently in Africa. In spite of all attention to globalization, 
world trade has also become more regionalized in the past decades. 
,QVRPHRWKHUDUHDV(XURSHPD\KDYHORVWZRUOGLQÀXHQFHWR86$7KH
GHFOLQHRI)UHQFKFXOWXUDOLQÀXHQFHLQWKHZRUOGIRULQVWDQFHLQ(J\SW,UDQ
DQGLQ/DWLQ$PHULFDKDVEHHQSLFNHGXSE\86LQÀXHQFH%XWLQÀXHQFHLV
not always dependent on power, as the widespread international interest in the 
policies of and institutions of little Scandinavia, and of Sweden in particular 
demonstrates. A future Europe as the world’s Scandinavia would be a position 
RILQÀXHQFHZLWKRXWSRZHU,WLVKDUGO\DEDGVFHQDULR
2.4.  The socio-economic system, of the global division of labour, social 
structuration and market exchange is mainly what Immanuel Waller-
stein has in mind when he talks about the world system 
In our list here it is the fourth system. It is a broader conceptualization than 
the world market or the world economy, as it also pays systematic attention to 
social structuration.
Europe is the world’s major trader and as such the centre of world market 
exchange. In 2000 a good fourth of all global foreign trade, 27 per cent, took 
place within Western Europe, almost a third (29 per cent) within all Europe and 
forty per cent of world exports originated in the countries of Western Europe. 
US exports, including commercial services, amounted to fourteen per cent of 
the world total and Japanese to seven Euroland is also running a large surplus 
on its current account, while US exports are increasingly unable to pay for the 
country’s imports, in spite of the continuing innovation dynamics of American 
capitalism.
In 2000, Western Europe owned more than half of the world’s stock of 
IRUHLJQGLUHFWLQYHVWPHQWSHUFHQWZKLOHWKH86RZQHGD¿IWKDQG-DSDQHVH
LQYHVWRUVEDUHO\¿YHSHUFHQW:HVWHUQ(XURSHLVDOVRWKHODUJHVWKRVW
of foreign investment, holding almost forty per cent of the world stock in 
2000, while USA harbours twenty per cent and Japan less than one per cent. 
,QÀRZWHUPVWKHFRXQWULHVRI:HVWHUQ(XURSHVHQWRXWPRUHWKDQWZRWKLUGV
(71%) of global foreign direct investment in 2000 and received half of it. 
86¿UPVDFFRXQWHGIRURQO\RQHHLJKWKRIWKHRXWZDUGÀRZRIIRUHLJQGLUHFW
investment. 
The EU25 is now the world’s biggest economy, with a GDP 25% larger than 
that of the United States, although this is an effect of political aggregation and 
not of superior economic performance. In terms of relative prosperity, the US-
Europe relation is reversed. Luxemburg apart, only Norway has a purchasing 
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power per capita on par with USA, in fact slightly superior, while France and 
Germany stay at 75% of the American level, Euroland slightly below that, and 
WKH(8DVDZKROHVWLOOIXUWKHUIURP$PHULFDQDIÀXHQFH
In sum, while no longer the richest part of the earth and no longer the prime 
economic model of the world, Western Europe is the central node of global 
ÀRZVRIWUDGHDQGRIFDSLWDOWKHLUPDLQPRYHU(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQKDVQRZ
given this world trade centre a base in the largest economy of the globe. Trade 
policy and the WTO are the only policy area and global institution, respectively, 
where the EU is standing up to the US.
Historically, Europe was both the global centre of industrial production 
and the only industrial society of the world, where industrial employment 
ever came to dominate post-agrarian society. Industrial social polarization and 
WKH(XURSHDQ URXWH WRPRGHUQLW\ WKURXJK LQWHUQDO FRQÀLFWPDGH FODVV FODVV
FRQVFLRXVQHVV FODVVRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGFODVV FRQÀLFWPRUHFOHDU H[SOLFLW DQG
more comprehensive than in other parts of the world. Europe was the world 
centre of the labour movement. De-industrialization, which stated in the late 
l960s, –in Eastern Europe after l989– has been a dramatic change of Europe.
The post-industrial legacy of industrial class struggle and class pressure 
is that Europe today is the least inegalitarian part of the world. In Britain 
Thatcherism managed to undo a large part of the secular gains of the popular 
classes, as did most capitalist restorations in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, 
Northern and Central Europe, east of Britain and west of Poland and of 
Carpathian Ukraine stands out as the global centre of what economic equality 
there is in this world.
TABLE 3. 7KH/HDVW8QHTXDO&RXQWULHVRIWKH:RUOGDQG&RPSDULVRQV ZLWK6RPH2WKHU2XWFRPHV'LVSRVDEOHLQFRPHDIWHUWD[HVDQGWUDQVIHUV
ROUTE AVERAGE GINI COEFFICIENT CIRCA 2000
6FDQGLQDYLDQ6RFLDO'HPRFUDF\ 25
3DUWLFXODU&RPPXQLVW/HJDF\ 25
:HVWHUQ(XURSHDQ&KULVWLDQDQG6RFLDO'HPRFUDF\ 26
1RUWKHDVW$VLDQ1DWLRQDO&DSLWDOLVP 32
OTHER OUTCOMES AVERAGE GINI COEFFICIENT CIRCA 2000
6SDLQO 30
USA 37
Russia 43
&KLQD 45
India (33)*
0H[LFR 49
Brazil 64
Nigeria 51
* Distribution of consumption expenditure, always more equally distributed than income. 
Scandinavian Social Democracy: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Particular Communist 
Legacy: Belarus, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany and Netherlands. Northeast Asia: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
It is noteworthy that Europe, and Northwestern Europe in particular, has 
been able to combine being the world’s central trader and transnational investor 
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with achieving the least inequality in the world. In the l990s, the distribution 
gap between this part of Europe and the rest of world increased substantially. 
Equality and trading are distinctive features of European society, likely to 
remain.
2.5. Finally, the world is a system of culture 
,W KDV IRXU FRUH HOHPHQWV ¿UVW DQ DUFKLWHFWXUH RI LGHQWLWLHV RI VHOIDQG
RWKHU LGHQWL¿FDWLRQV RI PDMRU VRFLDO JURXSV 6HFRQG D JHRFXOWXUDO SDWWHUQ
of values and norms. Thirdly, a structure of cognition, of the production and 
GLIIXVLRQRINQRZOHGJH$QGIRXUWKO\FRQ¿JXUDWLRQVRIV\PEROLFIRUPV7KH
latter include language patterns, “high” culture of the arts and popular or 
mass culture, of entertainment, life-styles and commercial brands. The culture 
system is sustained by a pattern of communications.
The European location in this complex, still under-researched system 
might be summed up in terms of, disputed and uncertain identity, characteristic 
values of secularism and postnationalism, cognitive demotion from leading 
centre to mainly second station, centrality of high culture but at best seconds 
in popular culture.
On a global scale, European identity has a got a shadowy existence, as a 
secondary part of a US-dominated “West”. Inside Europe, on the other hand, 
the rise of the EU and the end of the Cold War, have contributed positively 
WR D (XURSHDQ LGHQWLW\ EXW IDU IURP FRPSDUDEOH LQ VLJQL¿FDQFH WR QDWLRQDO
LGHQWLWLHVZKLFKE\WKHZD\¿UVWHPHUJHGLQ(XURSH
Historically, Western Europe was a totalitarian cultural area of the world, in 
principle mono-religious and mono-lingual. Jews and Muslims were expelled, 
and the prince decided which version of Christianity should prevail, according 
to the formula of the Westphalian Peace Treaty: cuius regio, eius religio. With 
the Enlightenment began a gradual retreat from zero tolerance in matters of 
religion. But then came the l9th century/early 20th century nationalist drive for 
one nation, one language. 
Eastern Europe, particularly the stretch from the Baltic Poland-Lithuania 
to the Ottoman Balkans, was by contrast the pluralistic and tolerant part of 
Europe, if often also arbitrary and unpredictable. Eastern nationalism of from 
late l9th century till 1950 and re-asserted again in the break-up of Yugoslavia in 
the l990s ended brutally that history of multi-ethnic multiculturalism. 
The new mass immigration into Western Europe means then a tremendous 
challenge to the identity of Europeans. France, the only European country of 
long immigration experience, has been relatively successful in incorporating 
immigrants into national identity, but even there actual socio-economic 
exclusion indicates increasing limitations. Most other Western European states 
have a much less absorbing national culture than the French, while hardly being 
more capable of accepting and developing a multi-ethnic national identity. The 
issues of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identities had better be approached on 
the European than on the national level, as part constructing a new, overarching 
European identity. A new European identity, not rooted in European history 
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and traditions, but built from European lessons from, and break with European 
and world history. 
In value terms, Europe has become the most secularized and rationalistic 
part of the world and also the least nationalistic or communalistic. Post-
religiousness and post-nationalism have become the most distinctive of 
European values. However, these are markers of a relative void. It is much 
less clear if there are any characteristic positive European values and what 
they are in that case. Possibly, egalitarianism and a solidaristic individualism 
–values embodied in the European welfare states, particularly in their north-
western variant– could be candidates, together with a universalistic conception 
of human rights. Together with North America, Europe is also the centre of 
the post-patriarchal world, where enduring gender inequality remains after the 
demise of the laws of fathers and husbands.
,QVFLHQWL¿FNQRZOHGJHSURGXFWLRQ(XURSHORVWLWVOHDGLQJSRVLWLRQWR86$
thanks to Fascism and to the outcome of WWII. Out of 371 Nobel laureates in 
science and economics for l946-2000, 218 or 59% were based at institutions 
in the United States, and 139, or 37 percent in Western Europe. Fourteen 
laureates, four cent worked in the rest of the world. In what is more a broad 
base measure, entries in the science citation index, USA and the EU15 were 
even in l996-2000, each producing 39 per cent of the citations. Japan got 6 per 
cent, Latin America and South Asia one per cent each (to what extent these 
SUL]HVDQGFLWDWLRQVUHÀHFWFRJQLWLYHDFKLHYHPHQWRQO\DQGWRZKDWH[WHQWWKH\
DOVRUHÀHFWSDWWHUQVRILQWHOOHFWXDOSRZHUDQGRIDWWHQWLRQLVDTXHVWLRQZKLFK
cannot answered here).
The competitive resources of US elite institutions make a EU-US redress 
XQOLNHO\ DOWKRXJK WKH YDVW ¿HOG RI VFLHQFH OHDYHV PDQ\ IURQWLHUV RSHQ WR
European initiatives. In the humanities and in social theory, there is still 
distinctive European scholarship among the global avant-garde. But they are 
in need of globalist infusions to overcome still considerable Eurocentric and/or 
national myopia.
With respect to symbolic forms, Europe rather long ago lost its edge in 
international mass culture to the US –jazz, Hollywood– to which television 
and commercial market brands have added more recently. Of the 100 most 
valuable commercial brands in the world, 63 are American, including 8 of 
the top ten, and 29 are Western European. But global mass culture has also 
important regional centres. Britain is clearly one of them, while the East and 
South Asian ones are clearly of mounting importance.
In terms of “high culture”, or high art, Europe is still the world centre of 
literature, of music, probably again of painting –after the end of NewYork 
Abstract Expressionism–, as it is in the world of luxury fashion. Documenta in 
German Kassel is the meeting-place the avant-garde art of the world. Together, 
Paris, London, and Milan are the leading global cities of high culture. Cultural 
leadership is always open to contestation though.
The electronic technology carrying the bulk of the current cultural system 
was largely developed in USA, personal computers, satellite broadcasting, the 
internet. But the basic technology is now in the global public domain, and now 
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driven by several major players. Europe has been particularly successful with 
respect to mobile telephony, Nokia, Ericsson. The future of communications 
technology and of its implications for the world system of culture seems to be 
completely open.
TO CONCLUDE
In a longterm historical perspective, Europe is a continent in relative 
decline, militarily and demographically, and as a world producer. The very 
success of its modernity and the social trauma of de-industrialization of the 
world’s most industrial continent have led to a wide-spread post-modernization 
and political uncertainty among almost all the main political families of 20th 
century Europe. European cultural hegemony was a l9th century phenomenon 
and began to erode by the end of World War I.
That means, in my opinion, that conventional big power dreams, still 
repeated aloud by political leaders of the former big powers o Europe, are 
futile.
On the other hand, the contemptuous anti-Europeanism which sees current 
Europe as on its way to becoming little more than a museum is completely 
ZURQJ(XURSHLV WKHKXERI WUDQVQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFÀRZVDQGWKH ODUJHVW LI
QRWWKHPRVWDIÀXHQWLQWHJUDWHGHFRQRP\,WLVWKHYDQJXDUGRIWUDQVQDWLRQDO
politics and transnational law and as such a worldwide source of inspiration. 
It is an ecologically privileged and well-constructed part of the world, capable 
of offering an extraordinary quality of life for ordinary people, and a centre of 
WKHDUWVDQGLIQRORQJHUOHDGLQJLWLVVWLOODPDMRUSURGXFHURIZRUOGVFLHQWL¿F
knowledge.
The dynamic potential of this European position in the world may taper off, 
in political and social confusion and division. Bad omens are visible, in the 
handling of the constitution and of the enlargement of the EU. But it may also 
be released, by a Second Modernity, a project of transnational, multiethnic, 
multicultural and egalitarian development.
